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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy veil piercing disputes have no true torts, and the primary target
of piercing activity is not the debtor. The first finding contradicts the
conventional wisdom that veil piercing primarily occurs in tort litigation. The
second finding contradicts the notion that a failing debtor's owners are the
likeliest targets of piercing.
The scholarship focusing on the doctrine of corporate veil piercing is
voluminous.I Yet, the previous data largely does not accord with two
presumptions of the legal academy-namely that piercing in tort should be
virtually automatic (piercing would prevent limited liability from diluting the
incentives for care of tort law) and that contract disputes are highly unlikely to
merit piercing (contracting parties should protect themselves against the risk of
their counterparties' insolvencies whereas piercing would erode their incentive
to protect themselves). This Article reveals that bankruptcy piercing focuses
exclusively on contract.
In a previous article, I have shown that piercing is eminently desirable in
contract disputes as an improvement over the common law error doctrine.2 The
previous article could have drawn inferential support from collective judicial
intuition by merely pointing out that courts pierce in contract at a more than
trivial rate. However, the article's cursory glance at the evidence suggested that
courts and litigants demonstrate a bias in favor of piercing in contract disputes
when compared to tort disputes. Traces of this bias also appear in other
empirical scholarship about piercing. The research of Professor Robert
Thompson shows an abundance of piercing in both contract and tort disputes,
and greater frequency of plaintiff success in contract piercing.3 Similarly,
Professors Hoffman and Boyd report that piercing occurs with greater
probability in consensual relationships than non-consensual ones.4 A tort
between strangers, of course, is the paradigmatic non-consensual source of
litigation, but not the only one.
1 See Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 853, 854
n.10 (2010) (reporting 5,482 law review articles on the topic of veil piercing).
2 Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FN. 121, 130-31
(2007).
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036,
1058 (1991).
4 See Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 895 (finding that a plaintiff asserting a claim as a voluntary
creditor is more likely to be successful on a veil piercing motion than in a case without a voluntary creditor).
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The Priest-Klein hypothesis' about plaintiff success rates casts doubt on
inferences from existing evidence because any differences in observed success
rates may result from biased litigation and settlement incentives rather than any
difference in underlying law and true likelihood of success. 6 This Article
empirically examines alternative explanations of the observed frequency of
contract piercing.
Part I updates the comparison of contract-to-tort ratios in veil piercing and
beyond. Part 11 discusses alternative explanations for the surprising frequency
of contract piercing, including the substitution of tort piercing with more
lenient theories of liability. Part III explains the construction of the bankruptcy
sample. Part IV discusses its observations. After the conclusion of the Article,
the Appendix lists the bankruptcy opinions analyzed herein.
I. THE ABUNDANCE OF CONTRACT PIERCING
Piercing in contract is surprisingly frequent compared to piercing in tort.
The comparison requires a baseline. The baseline is the universe of all contract
and tort opinions. If the ratio of total contract opinions to total tort opinions is
very different than the ratio of opinions about piercing in tort to those in
contract, then either a different mechanism produces piercing disputes, or the
litigants choose to pursue one more intensely when piercing.
Indeed, the comparison shows a vast change from overall contract and tort
to their mix in opinions about piercing. Tort becomes much less frequent
among piercing opinions than it is overall. Whereas this could be consistent
with the notion that tort plaintiffs do not pursue their piercing claims as
intensely as contract plaintiffs-which would give inferential support to the
idea that piercing in contract is easier-the ensuing analysis will show that the
more likely answer is that tort and contract piercing disputes are generated
differently than general disputes.
The data for the comparison consist of the entirety of opinions concerning
contract and tort from 1947 to 2010, inclusive. The source of the data is
Westlaw. For consistency with prior research, contract and tort opinions were
5 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5
(1984) (hypothesizing that where the potential gains or losses from litigation are equal for both plaintiff and
defendant, the rate of success for plaintiffs or appellants will tend toward 50% regardless of the substantive
standard of law).
6 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Any Frequency ofPlaintiff Victoty at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
493 (1996).
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retrieved using Thompson's search criteria. 7  Thompson's method also
identifies opinions that mention piercing. This is a text search, pursuing either
all forms of the verb "pierce" followed by "the corporate veil" or the phrase
"disregard the corporate entity."
S
The results of these searches are shown in Table 1, which also contains the
result of the statistical test.9 The searches identified over 75,000 contract
opinions, of which 693 mention piercing. The searches identified over 162,000
tort opinions, of which 394 mention piercing. The searches also identified
opinions about both contract and tort by implication. These include over
5,000 opinions, of which 113 mention piercing.
Notable is the fact that in the sample of all opinions, contract opinions
occur less than half as frequently as tort opinions, whereas in the sample of
opinions that mention piercing, contract opinions are almost twice as numerous
as tort opinions. The statistical test confirms the difference with great statistical
7 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1036 n.1. West identifies contract opinions with a single Key Number,
95. Tort opinions are those that fall under four Key Numbers, 379, 272, 48av, and 48avi. The resulting
searches need date range specifications narrower than 1947 to 2010 because they exceed the maximum number
of opinions that Westlaw retrieves. All counts were made on January 25, 2011. As West corrects errors in
opinions' Key Numbers periodically, later searches will ikely produce slightly different counts.
8 Accordingly, the search for contract opinions that mention piercing becomes "to(95) & ("pierc! the
corporate veil" "disregard the corporate entity") & date(aft 1946 & bef 201 1)."
9 The statistical test is called the chi-test and is used to determine differences between data that fall into
categories, like categories of opinions or outcomes of tosses of dice or coins (as opposed to data that consist of
numerical values). The test requires that the comparison sample be aggregated and requires the calculation of
the expected number of each category. In the case of the piercing sample, the test requires we calculate the
fraction that piercing cases (in aggregate) are of all cases, and then apply that fraction (about .0049) to
determine the expected number of contract piercing opinions, tort piercing opinions, and piercing opinions
with both (about 372, 800, and 28, respectively). The chi-test (included in built-in spreadsheet software
functions as CIETEST) compares those to the actual counts of the last column of Table 1 and computes the
probability that the difference is due to chance rather than a different generative mechanism. See generally
NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS BASIC TOOLS FOR
NORMATIVE REASONING 294-97 (2005): DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 525-46 (3d ed. 1998).
10 The number of contract opinions includes some opinions on both contract and tort. Similarly, tort
opinions include some on both. Summing those two and subtracting the number of opinions on either contract
or tort gives the number of opinions that include both contract and tort. For example, if the contract opinions
were five, three of which include tort, and tort opinions four, then the number of opinions on either contract or
tort would be six. Summing the five contract opinions and the four tort opinions and subtracting the number of
opinions about either gives three, the number of opinions about both (3-5+4-6).
The count of contract opinions gives the sum of(i) only contract opinions and (ii) of opinions on both
contract and tort call that c + b. The count of torts gives (i) torts only and (ii) both, t + b. The count for either
contract or tort gives c + t + b. Note that the sum of the counts for contracts and that for torts counts twice the
opinions on both and can be transformed from (c + b) + (t + b) to c + t + 2b. Subtracting from that the number
of the search for either, c + t + b, leaves b (b - c + t + 2b - c - t - b).
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significance, i.e., it indicates that the probability that the same (random)
mechanism produces both mixes is infinitesimal.





Contract and 5,727 1
tort:
Tort: 162,834 394
Chi-test p-value: 0.0000.. %
The mechanism that produces opinions changes in piercing. The change
can arise either in the stage of the production of the disputes or, after that, from
the behavior of the parties. Opinions that mention piercing may be the result of
a mechanism that produces disproportionately more contract disputes.
Alternatively, the parties may use a different mechanism when deciding
whether to pursue piercing, either abandoning or settling disproportionately
more tort disputes or pursuing contract piercing more intensely.
11. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE ABUNDANCE OF CONTRACT
PIERCING
The text that follows explores two explanations for the preponderance of
contract piercing opinions. The first is that tort disputes do not carry over to
piercing because other, easier, theories of liability displace piercing. Other
legal theories exist that impose liability on parents with greater ease (i.e.,
greater probability of success for the plaintiff) than piercing because they
require neither fraud nor that control be excessive. These theories include
vicarious liability and product liability. The second possible explanation is that
piercing claims arise as a subsidiary approaches insolvency, breaching all its
contracts but not systematically causing more torts, so that the circumstances
produce more contract disputes than tort disputes.
A. Do Product and Vicarious Liability Displace Tort Piercing?
If legal doctrine provided tort claimants with an easier theory to impose
liability on a parent, then tort plaintiffs would not have to argue piercing but
would try to impose liability on the parent using the alternative theory. Legal
2011]
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doctrine provides two such alternative theories to tort plaintiffs: vicarious
liability and product liability.
The doctrine of vicarious liability imposes liability on principals of agents,
who are not independent contractors, for accidents caused by actions within the
agent's scope of authority."I This factual setting could give rise to veil piercing
as well as a vicarious liability claim because the court could treat the parent's
control of the subsidiary as justification for piercing if the control was
excessive. The theory of vicarious liability is easier for the plaintiff than veil
piercing because under vicarious liability control does not need to be excessive
and no showing of fraud is necessary.
The search begins by looking for tort disputes, augmented with text
designed to identify vicarious liability. 12 The search identifies 8,430 opinions.
Note that since the search includes the Key Numbers for torts, it identifies
opinions included in the tort sample but not necessarily included in the
piercing sample. Once terms are included to identify opinions that refer to veil
piercing, the search produces seventy-four opinions. Several thousand opinions
about vicarious liability do not mention piercing (though it is feasible that the
plaintiff could have pursued piercing). Thus, vicarious liability may displace
piercing. It is worthwhile to note, however, that agency theory is also used to
ignore separation of entities in the contract setting.
13
The other theory supplanting piercing may be product liability. Tort
liability can also be imposed on a parent-manufacturing corporation for
liability caused by products sold by its subsidiaries (and other resellers) under
the doctrine of product liability. 14 This theory can impose liability on a parent
even when the subsidiary maintains scrupulous separation from the parent and
no grounds for piercing exist. The West Key Numbers for product liability
opinions that would also appear in the search for all tort opinions formulate a
search that produces 4,861 opinions. 1 Of those, thirty-one opinions mention
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(1) (2006) ("An employer is subject to vicarious liability for
a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of employment.").
12 The search identifies opinions about vicarious liability by searching for the root "vicarious-"
immediately preceding the root "liab-" or for the Latin term for this theory, respondeat superior. The resulting
search is "to(48av! 48avi! 272 379) & ("vicarious! liab!" "respondeat superior") & date(aft 1946 & bef201 1)."
See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998) ("One engaged in the business of selling or
otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the defect.").
15 As the West Key Number fbr product liability is not included in the main search for tort opinions, this
search needs to find those opinions that would appear in the main search while also having the product liability
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piercing. Thus, product liability may render pointless the discussion of piercing
in many cases.
Combining the two sets of searches avoids overlaps. Searching for either
vicarious liability or product liability produces 13,076 opinions, with ninety-
eight mentioning piercing. Thus, it is possible that the piercing sample is
missing many tort disputes, namely those in which plaintiffs attempt to impose
liability on a parent on either of these two theories that are easier to win than
piercing. While it is impossible to estimate the proportion of potential piercing
disputes in vicarious liability and product liability ones, it is also difficult to
imagine them containing many disputes that would not be candidates for
piercing. All vicarious liability disputes should be candidates for piercing
because of the agency link. A significant fraction of product liability disputes
may not be candidates for piercing, because the remote manufacturer did not
own or control downstream entities. The conclusion that, without these
theories, more tort piercing disputes would appear is inescapable.
B. Does Subsidiary Insolvency Lead to a Multitude of Contract Breaches?
An alternative explanation for the plethora of contract disputes in opinions
about piercing could be the unique circumstances of the target. A piercing
claim is only made when a corporation (or other entity with limited liability)
becomes insolvent. Without insolvency, piercing is unnecessary since the
debtor can satisfy its obligations. Insolvency is a special circumstance, this
explanation argues, which causes many piercing claims to be made in contract
but few in tort. The argument that insolvency is the cause of the difference can
be examined in a sample of disputes that arise surrounding insolvency. The
opinions of bankruptcy courts provide such a sample, searchable in Westlaw as
a separate database. 16
A threshold question is the frequency of contract and tort disputes in
bankruptcy. The searches identifying contract and tort opinions reveal that
bankruptcy courts have produced, over the same period of time, 1,621 contract
opinions, eighty-four opinions about both contract and tort, and 266 opinions
about tort only. The contract-to-tort ratio is over 6:1 (1,621:266) whereas Table
1 had revealed a contract-to-tort ratio of about one-half (1:2) in the sample of
all opinions, and less than 2:1 in piercing opinions. Thus, the bankruptcy
Key Number, 313ak. Accordingly, the search text is "to(313ak') & to(48av! 48avi 272 379) & date(aft 1946
& bef 201 I)."
16 The database name is "tbkr-bct."
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sample presents a contract-to-tort ratio even more extreme in its difference
from the sample of all opinions than that of the piercing opinions. Therefore,
the bankruptcy sample differs from the sample of all opinions even more than
piercing opinions do.
111. THE BANKRUPTCY PIERCTNG SAMPLE
Before becoming absorbed in this remarkable difference, one must analyze
searches for veil piercing in the sample of bankruptcy court opinions. The only
adjustment made is to expand the search to include substantive consolidation, a
theory of bankruptcy law that produces the results of piercing by consolidating
different entities into a single bankruptcy estate (as opposed to procedural
consolidation, which unifies the procedural aspect of the bankruptcies of
several entities while maintaining their separate existence as debtors). The
search includes the roots "substantiv- consol-."' The resulting search produces
ninety-six opinions: seventy-seven about contract, five about both contract and
tort, and twenty-four about tort. While noting that the contract-to-tort ratio is
about 4:1, one should delve deeper. Since the number of opinions is
manageable, they can be subjected to closer scrutiny.
A. Sample Winnowing
Closer scrutiny greatly reduces the sample. It reveals that thirty-six
opinions, despite satisfying the search terms, are not truly about piercing.'
8
One more opinion drops for being a duplicate of a case that is already in the
sample.19 Three more must drop for being pointless objections to consensual
consolidating reorganization plans that received the adequate majority votes of
20the voting creditor classes. One more drops for pointlessly attempting to
17 Accordingly, the search for both contract and tort is "to(48av! 48avi! 272 379) & to(95) & ("pierc! the
corporate veil" "disregard the corporate entity" "substantiv! consolidat"') & date(aft 1946 & bef 2011)" the
search for contract or both is "to(95) & ("pierc! the corporate veil" "disregard the corporate entity"
"substantiv! consolidat!") & date(aft 1946 & bef 2011)" the search for tort or both is "to(48av' 48avi' 272
379) & ("pierc! the corporate veil" "disregard the corporate entity" "substantiv! consolidat!") & date(aft 1946
& bef 2011 ).l"
18 See infra Appendix (listing the opinions).
19 See Drake v. Franklin Equip. Co. (In re Franklin Equip. Co.), 416 BR. 483 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009).
20 See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commc'ns Operating, L.L.C. (In re Charter Commc'ns),
419 BR. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Mirant Corp. v. S. Co. (In re
Mirant Corp.), No. 03-46590-DML-1 1, 2005 WL 6440372 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 24, 2005); Smith v. Bank
of N.Y. (In re Holywell Corp.), 161 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). The pointlessness of these cases sterns
from the fact that § 1129 does not prohibit consolidating plans while giving creditors other grounds for
objecting to a plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006).
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consolidate cases of natural persons, here a debtor trying to consolidate with an
ex-spouse. 21 Finally, one more drops for being a statutory dispute about neither
contract nor tort, but rather labor law.22 After these forty-two opinions drop,
the remaining sample is fifty-four opinions that are truly about piercing or
consolidation in the bankruptcy context. Reading the opinions reveals none
that are both about contract and tort. Forty-four are contract disputes and ten
are tort disputes, about a 4:1 ratio, the same ratio as before eliminating the
above cases.
B. Fiduciary Perplexity
In going through the tort opinions, the frequency of fiduciary breach claims
is remarkable. Seven of the ten tort opinions are about fiduciary breaches. Yet,
fiduciary breach claims arise very differently than the paradigmatic tort among
strangers. They consist essentially of a voluntary investor's complaint that the
investor's (likely indirect) agent was not faithful in the discharge of the agent's
duties to the investor. The way that agents who are corporate managers must
exercise their discretion is not describable in detail and, therefore, it is not
contractible. The essence of the fiduciary breach claim is inappropriate action
of an agent in a consensual relationship and is much closer to the essence of a
contractual dispute than to a tort dispute. Accordingly, fiduciary breach claims
are categorized separately by this Article.
The joinder of fiduciary breach claims with piercing claims is curious.
Investors who prevail in a fiduciary breach claim will have a direct claim
against the agents who breached their fiduciary obligations. To the extent that
the agent is the owner of the failed corporation, piercing is redundant. The
owner is already liable to the investor for the fiduciary breach, and being liable
under a piercing theory as well may not make much difference. Thus, piercing
in fiduciary breach claims is likely the type of claim that the court will
consider sometimes redundant, and not necessarily having a substantive effect.
Indeed, piercing in this subsample turns out to be the least frequent, as Table 2
below shows.
Fiduciary breach claims also have a procedural quirk. Inside bankruptcy the
trustee can exercise those claims against the owner or parent for the creditors'
21 See In re Blair, 226 B.R 502 (Bankr. D. Me. 1998).
22 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Tenn-Ero Corp. (In re Tenn-Ero Corp.), 14 B.R 884 (Bankr. D
Mass. 1981).
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benefit, but outside bankruptcy the creditors are much less likely to be able to
force a corporation to make a fiduciary breach claim against its owners.
That fiduciary breach claims are 70% of the tort claims and 13% of the
sample of fifty-two opinions seems remarkably frequent. A quick check
verifies that fiduciary claims are much rarer outside of bankruptcy. The West
Key Numbers that identify fiduciary breach are 101k307 (fiduciary nature of
relation of directors to corporation) and 1011310 (management of corporate
affairs). The search identifying tort piercing cases with those two Key
Numbers added produces eighteen opinions.23 In other words, of the 469
opinions where creditors pursue piercing outside of bankruptcy making tort or
both tort and contract claims, fiduciary breach is alleged in only 4% of cases,
while inside of bankruptcy it is alleged in 70% of cases-a difference that is
24statistically significant. Unquestionably, the fiduciary breach claims in the
sample are a special case.
C. Whose Veil?
The purpose motivating the journey into bankruptcy cases is the
exploration of the mechanism that causes the proliferation of contract disputes
in piercing. Accordingly, the identification of the piercing claims is also
important. While one would expect that the debtor's veil is the one pierced, the
reality is surprising. Out of the fifty-four opinions in the sample, the debtor's
veil is attacked in eighteen. By contrast, in thirty-six of these disputes, the veil
attacked is not the debtor's. This is to say that others' veils are attacked twice
as often as debtors' veils.
Attempts to pierce others' veils are caused by a procedural quirk. If the
debtor was solvent, then those disputes would either be between the debtor and
the third party, the veil of which the debtor attacks, or would not involve the
debtor at all. Rather, these disputes would be between two creditors of the
debtor, one attacking the other's veil.
23 The search string is "to(48av! 48avi! 272 379) & ("pierc! the corporate veil" "disregard the corporate
entity") & date(aft 1946 & bef2010) & to(101k307' 101k310!)." The databases are "allcases, allfeds."
24 The relevant statistical test is again the chi-test. The hypothesis to be refuted is that, both inside and
outside of bankruptcy, the same mechanism produces the observed frequency of fiduciary breach opinions.
The expected number of fiduciary breach opinions in the bankruptcy sample of ten would then be about 0.4.
The fact that the observed sample has seven opinions makes the probability that the same mechanism produces




Putting aside the seven fiduciary breach claims leaves three true tort
opinions. How many of those three are the paradigmatic cases of a tort
between strangers? None. Even the true tort cases start as consensual
relationships and the torts at issue are fraud and conversion. 25 Thus, to the
extent that the search in the bankruptcy sample was for piercing in true non-
consensual relations, no information appears. The sample contains no cases
involving non-consensual relationships.
E. Bankruptcy Piercing Activity
Table 2 presents the results of the examination of the bankruptcy cases,
with detail increasing from left to right. The table has three horizontal panels:
the opinions about contract, tort, and fiduciary breach. The first column
presents the number of opinions about each type of dispute; the percentage of
opinions in which the veil is actually pierced; and the contract-to-tort ratio,
labeled "C:T." This ratio ignores fiduciary breach.
The second column separates the opinions of the first column depending on
the veil targeted. It reports the opinions about the piercing of the debtor's veil
and the veils of others. Under each count is the corresponding contract-to-tort
ratio. The third column presents the piercing outcome for each category of veil
and law. It offers the number of opinions that pierce the veil and the percentage
those represent, i.e., the percentage pierced.
25 See supra text accompanying notes 26-42.
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Table 2: Bankruptcy Piercing Activity
[Vol. 27
Law Veil Pierced?
Contract: 44 Debtor's Veil 9 1
% Pierced? 20.5% C:T 4.5:1 11.1%
C:T 14.7:1 Other's veil 35 8
C:T 35:1 22.9%
Tort (not fid'ry 3 Debtor's Veil 2 2
br.):
% Pierced? 100.0% 100.0%
Other's veil I I
100.0%
Fiduciary breach: 7 Debtor's Veil 7 1
% Pierced? 14.3% 14.3%
Other's veil 0 0
Table 2 shows that the piercing opinions about contract include forty-four
cases, of which nine are about the debtor's veil. One pierces, producing a
11.1% piercing rate. Thirty-five of the contract opinions are about the veil of
non-debtors, and eight of those pierce, producing a 22.9% piercing rate. Since
out of the total forty-four contract opinions, nine opinions pierce, the rate of
piercing in contract is 20.5% overall. There are three tort opinions. Two
involve the debtor's veil, and all pierce, producing a rate of tort piercing
involving the debtor's veil of 100% throughout. There are seven fiduciary
breach opinions, all concerning the debtor's veil. Only one pierces, producing
a 14.3% rate. The overall contract-to-tort ratio is 14.7:1, the ratio where the
veil is the debtor's is 4.5:1, and that where the veil is others' is 35:1.
Notice that the table does not make a distinction based on who brings the
piercing claim. One could expect different biases based on whether the
bankruptcy trustee or a different entity brings the piercing claim. Yet, the
addition of that factor did not reveal additional information.
The next paragraphs discuss the following: that piercing in tort is universal;
that most of the attempts to pierce target the veils of others (rather than the
debtor) and that courts pierce those veils (in contract disputes) more than twice
as often as those of debtors (they pierce others' veils with a 22.9% rate while
debtors' veils with an 11.1% rate).
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IV. MESSAGES FROM BANKRUPTCY
First, this Part discusses how, in tort disputes, piercing succeeds in every
case. Next, this Part discusses the plethora of attempts to pierce others' veils
along with their nearly one-quarter success rate.
A. Consensual Tort & Universal Piercing
The success of tort piercing seems striking. Yet, a slight discrepancy
appears given the complete absence of non-consensual relationships in the
sample. Since all disputes arose in consensual relationships, a question arises
as to whether the courts could have written these three tort opinions as contract
opinions.
The dispute of In re Stone involved the debtor attacking the veil of a
corporation used to defraud the debtor.26 The court's opinion detailed over
seven pages of facts, describing an intimate financial relationship between the
lawyer that the debtor hired and the financier who advanced funds through
intermediary entities with very onerous terms. 27 The court held that the two
conspired to defraud the debtor, pierced the veils of the intermediate entities in
order to reach the financier, and disbarred the lawyer.
28
The dispute of In re Restaurant Development Group, Inc., featured the
trustee stating a fraud claim against the debtor's owners and seeking to
pierce. 29 Initially, the debtor managed the several successful restaurants that
the debtor's owners operated. 30 The owners gradually transitioned the
receivables and assets of the debtor corporation to a new corporation. 31 When
the debtor was left with no assets or income, it entered liquidation.32 The court
considered the scheme abusive and pierced the debtor's veil so that the
creditors could reach the owners' assets.
33
The facts of In re Callaghan show an individual creditor piercing the
debtor's veil due to a vehicle repair that went awry, leading to conversion and
26 Stone v. Atherton (In re Stone), 421 BR. 401 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2009).
27 Id. at 408 15.
28 Id. at419, 421-22.
29 Paloian v. Greenfield (In re Rest. Dev. Grp., Inc.), 394 B.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. II. 2008).
30 Id. at 176.
31 id.
32 id.
33 Id. at 183-84.
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fraud claims. 34 The creditor, a firefighter, delivered his motor home, valued at
$20,000, 35 for repairs to the debtor in the fall. 36 Due to the debtor's delays, the
motor home was not ready for the firefighter's annual vacation in late fall and
early winter and was consequently vandalized.37 The firefighter's insurance
covered the vandalism repairs minus a $100 deductible, over which the parties
had a protracted dispute that prevented the firefighter from using it for the
same vacation period the next year. 38 The court noted that at some point in
time the firefighter was unable to get the motor home due to work injuries.
39
The debtor imposed a garage-keeper's lien on the motor home and sold it for
$500.40 The sale took place with no public announcement of an auction,
despite the fact that the firefighter served the debtor with a restraining order
not to sell it.4 1 The court found the debtor's conduct to be so outrageous as to
constitute fraud and pierced the veil for the firefighter's benefit.
42
A straightforward interpretation of these three cases could be that courts
observing culpable owners always pierce the corporate veil in tort. However,
since all three tort disputes include a fraud claim in a consensual setting, it
would be possible for the courts writing these opinions to restate them as
contractual fraud claims. The complexity and large number of the underlying
(fraudulent) transactions makes this highly unlikely but not completely
impossible. Playing devil's advocate to resist drawing an inference from this
evidence, one would need to argue that courts may be biased to characterize
these as torts, but no reason for this choice by the courts exists. The more
likely interpretation is to conclude that in disputes involving intentional torts,
the veil is very likely pierced.
B. Piercing Non-Debtors' Veils
That only a third of the piercing attempts target the debtor, while two-thirds
target others, is counterintuitive. Of all the parties involved in a bankruptcy,
the debtor is the only one that is certainly insolvent (by virtue of being in
bankruptcy). Therefore, the debtor should attract the preponderance of attempts
34 Bungert v. Callaghan (In re Callaghan), 42 BR. 821 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
" Id. at 824.
36 Id. at 822.
37 id.




42 Id. at 824.
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to pierce the veil. Moreover, attempts to pierce others' veils could have
occurred outside bankruptcy, either at the debtor's initiative or at the initiative
of creditors. Nevertheless, others' veils are targeted twice as often as the
debtor's and are pierced at twice the rate in bankruptcy (almost 23% compared
to 11.1%).43
The relative success in piercing non-debtors' veils is important for several
reasons. It alleviates the concern that the bankruptcy process opens the door to
frivolous piercing claims. Granted, the bankruptcy process may be faster and
less costly than the regular trial process, but this is not frivolous litigation.
Moreover, forum shopping does not appear to be an issue. Forum shopping
would involve the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a solvent debtor for the
purpose of bringing a piercing claim in the bankruptcy court. Not only is such
a practice not apparent in the sample, but also bankruptcy procedure allows
non-debtors to obviate it, depending on whether the veil-piercing claim is
considered a non-core proceeding and whether the non-debtors are entitled to a
jury trial. Core proceedings are those adjudicating disputes arising under the
Bankruptcy Code, such as avoidable transfers. 44 Since veil piercing arises
under state law, rather than the bankruptcy code, it is not a core proceeding but
a related proceeding. The jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts does extend to
related proceedings but only to the extent the parties do not object. This means
that the creditors can protect themselves. If bankruptcy courts were biased in
favor of piercing, then creditors would object to the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts and remove their disputes to the federal district court. The same result
follows if creditors have the right to a jury trial and demand it.
45
4' However, due to the small sample, the difference in these piercing rates does not reach statistical
significance. The chi-test indicates that the observed difference can arise by change with well over 10%
probability. The chi-test aggregates attempts to pierce veils, namely the nine attempts to pierce the debtor's
veil with the thirty-five attempts to pierce others' veils, into lorty-four. Then aggregates the successful
piercings, namely the one of a debtor's veil and the eight on others, into nine. This 9-in-44, or 20.5%, forms
the expectation applied to each group. Thus, the expected number of successful piercings in the nine attempts
against debtors' veils is 1.84, and the expected number of successful piercings in the thirty-five attempts
against others' veils is 7.15, not far enough from the one and eight, respectively, of the data. Nevertheless, an
approach based on Bayes' method that would take into account a prior probability of observing piercings of
non-debtor's veils that is low, could give credence to the observed difference.
44 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
45 See Granfinanciera, S.A., v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Janine C. Ciallella, Note, Should
Bankruptcy Judges Be Permitted to Conduct Jury Trials?, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 175 (2000).
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Granted, situations will exist where removing to the federal district court
may not make a significant difference. An example could be In re Tyson.46 The
plan administrator for the famous boxer Mike Tyson sought to pierce the veil
of a UK and a Gibraltar entity under foreign law in order to reach the foreign
individual promoters who were withholding the boxer's purse from a
postpetition boxing match held in Kentucky. 47 The bankruptcy court pierced
the foreign corporations' veils using UK law.48 If all domestic courts would
tend to pierce more easily than UK courts, even applying UK law, then such
defendants would not benefit from removal to the district court, since the
district court would have the same bias.
A further study of the success of piercing in this sample is necessary. The
piercing rate of 22.9% deviates from the Priest-Klein prediction of 50%
success rate. Thus, plaintiffs' successes still appears as too rare, requiring
further explanation. The observed frequency can be partly explained by the
realization that piercing is not an independent claim but a supplementary one
that is added to an underlying claim at little cost. When a party makes the
decision to pursue litigation, the probability for victory in the main claim likely
overshadows the importance of the probability of success in the additional
piercing claim. Such examples appear in this sample. In re Tousa, Inc.,
involves an attempt by the creditors' committee to avoid certain liens and
substantively consolidate the case of the debtor with the lien transferees. 49 The
creditors' consolidation attempt was not successful, but their main action was
successful in avoiding the liens. Thus, the cost of litigating the substantive
consolidation claim need not have been independently justified. The cost of
litigating the avoidance of the liens was justified by the outcome and the
consolidation claim was simply added to it.
Paradoxically, attacks on debtors' veils are the minority of the sample. This
phenomenon refutes the idea that insolvency leads to widespread breaches by
the debtor, triggering numerous piercing attacks to reach the debtor's owners.
46 Neilson v. Straight-Out Promotions, LLC (In re Tyson), 412 BR. 623 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009),
vacated in part, 433 B.R. 68 (S.DN.Y. 2010) (confirming the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, in part because
the parties did not object and in part because the dispute was about the execution of the plan, hence, core).
41 Jd. at 628.
41 Id. at 629.
49 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc., v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Tousa, Inc.,)
422 BR. 783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
50 Id. at 786.
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Future research should analyze the desirability of non-debtor piercing.
Bankruptcy procedure gives standing to the trustee and the creditors to raise
piercing claims that the debtor could have raised. Would these debtors make
these piercing claims outside bankruptcy? Would they face the same odds of
success? Is the facilitation of these claims by bankruptcy as desirable as it
appears at first blush?
CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed the relative ease of piercing in tort and in contract.
The analysis started with the implications from the Priest-Klein hypothesis
when applied to the relative frequency of tort and contract opinions overall
compared to opinions that mention piercing.
Two explanations for the frequency of contract-piercing litigation were
examined. Tort piercing may be rare because it is displaced by other, more
viable theories of liability: product liability and vicarious liability.
Alternatively, contract piercing may be more frequent because failing
subsidiaries breach most of their contracts and attract unusually frequent
piercing litigation.
Displacement of tort piercing by easier theories of liability is plausible. The
displacement of piercing in tort by easier theories also renders moot the policy
question of whether courts pierce in tort sufficiently easily. True tort disputes
between strangers do not reach the question of piercing, presumably because
other theories let the plaintiffs reach the assets of parents easier than piercing
would. Therefore, the concern that piercing in tort may be too difficult has
little consequence.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy sample refuted the idea that attempts to pierce
the debtor's veil are the dominant piercing activity in bankruptcy. Rather,
attempts to pierce others' veils were twice as frequent and twice as successful
as attempts to pierce the debtor's veil. While not clearly understood, this type
of activity is consistent with the idea that the web of commerce reacts to the
removal of one of its nodes by reassessing the related relations through
piercing. The bankruptcy of the debtor means that a member of the web of
commerce has disappeared. One of the ripple effects of this disappearance is
that others who dealt with the debtor will try to pierce loosely related veils.
That the bankruptcy of one debtor leads its creditors to seek to pierce others'
veils may be important and requires further normative analysis.
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Appendix: Bankruptcy Piercing Opinions
This Appendix collects the bankruptcy opinions analyzed in this Article.
The column "P" identifies the opinions that truly involve piercing or
consolidation. The column "C" identifies the opinions that are identified by the
contract piercing search (performed in the bankruptcy database of Westlaw,
fbkr-bct). The column "T" marks the ones identified by the corresponding tort
search.
# Name P C T
In re England Motor Co., 426 B.R. 178 (Bankr. N.D.
1 Miss. 2010). X X
2 Cox v. St. John (In re St. John), 430 B.R. 804 (Bankr. X X
W.D. Mich. 2010).
Bourdeau Bros., Inc., v. Montagne (In re Montagne),
3 No. 08-10916, 2010 WL 271347 (Bankr. D. Vt. Jan. X X
22, 2010).
4 Blixseth v. Kirschner (In re Yellowstone Mountain X
Club, LLC), 436 B.R. 598 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010).
5 Picard v. Chais (In re Bernard L. MadoffInv. Sec. X
LLC), 440 B.R. 282 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Rice v. Bennett (In re Supermarket Investors, Inc.),
No. 4:09-bk-17497, 2010 WL 5115903 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. Dec. 14, 2010).
In re GCP CT Sch. Acquisition, LLC, No. 09-11846-
7 WCH, 2010 WL 4366139 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 28, X
2010).
8 Nilsen v. Neilson (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), 419 X
B.R. 807 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
9 Cash Am. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fox (In re Fox), 370 X X
B.R. 104 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007).
Pioneer Liquidating Corp. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Consol.




# Name P C T
Charter Asset Corp. v. Victory Mkts., Inc. (In re
11 Victory Mkts., Inc.), 221 B.R. 298 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. X
1998).
12 Ag Venture Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Montagne (In re X X XMontagne), 425 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2009).
13 Dixon v. Am. Cmty. Bank & Trust (In re Gluth Bros. X XConst., Inc.), 424 B.R. 379 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 2009).
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Commc'ns
14 Operating, LLC (In re Charter Commc'ns), 419 B.R. X
221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc.
15 v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc. (In re Tousa, Inc.), 422 B.R. X X
783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
16 Stone v. Atherton (In re Stone), 421 B.R. 401 (Bankr. X XW.D. Ky. 2009).
17 Drake v. Franklin Equip. Co. (In re Franklin Equip. X XCo.), 418 B.R. 176 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009).
18 Drake v. Franklin Equip. Co. (In re Franklin Equip. XCo.), 416 B.R. 483 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009).
19 Neilson v. Straight-Out Promotions, LLC (In re X XTyson), 412 B.R. 623 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
201 Forest St. LLC v. LBM Fin. LLC (In re 201
20 Forest St. LLC), 409 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. X X
2009).
21 Gouveia v. Cahillane (In re Cahillane), 408 B.R. 175 X(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009).
22 In re Nutritional Sourcing Corp., 398 B.R. 816 X(Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
23 Kismet Acquisition, LLC, v. Icenhower (In re XIcenhower), 398 B.R. 902 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2008).
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# Name P C T
Barnhill's Buffets, Inc. v. SCS Gen. Contractors, Inc.,
24 (In re Barnhill's Buffets, Inc.), 397 B.R. 51 (Bankr. X X
M.D. Tenn. 2008).
25 Bhambri v. Allied Enters., LLC (In re Geiler), 398 X XB.R. 661 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2008).
26 Silverman v. KPMG LLP (In re Allou Distribs., Inc.), X395 B.R. 246 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008).
27 Paloian v. Greenfield (In re Rest. Dev. Grp., Inc.), 397 XB.R. 891 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
28 Paloian v. Greenfield (In re Rest. Dev. Grp., Inc.), 394 X XB.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
29 O'Connell v. Arthur Andersen LLP (In re AlphaStar X XIns. Grp. Ltd.), 383 B.R. 231 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Morgan Creek Prods., Inc. v. Franchise Pictures, LLC,
30 (In re Franchise Pictures LLC), 389 B.R. 131 (Bankr. X
C.D. Cal. 2008).
31 Brown v. Real Estate Res. Mgmt., LLC, (In re Polo X XBuilders Inc.), 388 B.R. 338 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
32 In re Solutia Inc., 379 B.R. 473 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. X
2007).
33 In re WorldCom, Inc., 374 B.R. 94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. X X
2007).
Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc. v. Desnick (In re
34 Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc.), 360 B.R. 787 X X
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007).
35 Schnelling v. Crawford (In re James River Coal Co.), X
360 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
Sunset Hollow Props., LLC v. Bank of W. Mass. (In
36 re Sunset Hollow Props., LLC), 359 B.R. 366 (Bankr. X X
D. Mass. 2007).
37 Flener v. Turner (In re Vencom, Inc.), 355 B.R. 3 X X
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006).
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38 In re GlycoGenesys, Inc., 352 B.R. 568 (Bankr. D. X
Mass. 2006).
39 In re Nat'l Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc., 351 B.R. X
323 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006).
40 Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. X X1), 353 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006).
41 In re Rolling Thunder Gas Gathering, L.L.C., 348 XB.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006).
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Verestar,
42 Inc. v. Am. Tower Corp. (In re Verestar, Inc.), 343 X X
B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Nisselson v. Empyrean Inv. Fund, L.P. (In re
43 MarketXT Holdings Corp.), 336 B.R. 39 (Bankr. X
S.D.N.Y 2006).
44 In re Mirant Corp., 2005 WL 6440372 (Bankr. N.D. X X
Tex. May 24, 2005).
45 Beltrami v. Beltrami (In re Beltrami), 324 B.R. 255 X
(Bankr. M.D. Penn. 2005).
46 Limor v. Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781 X X(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005).
Holcomb Health Care Servs., LLC v. Quart Ltd., LLC
47 (In re Holcomb Health Care Servs., LLC), 329 B.R. X
622 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2004).
48 Kittay v. Ati. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Grp., X XLLC), 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
49 Brown v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re X X X
Brown), 319 B.R. 278 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004).
50 Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets, X XL.L.C.), 315 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004).
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51 In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 320 B.R. 587 X X(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004).
52 Tese-Miller v. TPAC, L.L.C. (In re Ticketplanet.com), X X313 B.R. 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Parkway Provision Co. v. Bankr. Estate of Devos, Inc.
53 (In re Devos, Inc.), 3 10 B.R. 520 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. X X
2004).
54 Kittay v. Flutie N.Y. Corp. (In re Flutie N.Y. Corp.), X X
310 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
55 IT Grp., Inc. v. Bookspan (In re The IT Grp., Inc.), X X
305 B.R. 402 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
56 In re King, 305 B.R. 152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). X X
57 Lichtenstein v. Anderson (In re E. Continuous Forms, x X
Inc.), 302 B.R. 320 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003).
Nat'l City Bank of Minneapolis v. Lapides (In re
58 Transcolor Corp.), 296 B.R. 343 (Bankr. D. Md. X X
2003).
InSITE Servs. Corp. v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (In re
59 InSITE Servs. Corp.), 287 B.R. 79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. X X
2002).
Liquidating Grantor's Trust of Proteva, Inc. v. Finova
60 Capital Corp. (In re Proteva, Inc.), 290 B.R. 584 X
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002).
Sec. Investor Prot. Co. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co. (In re




Name P C T
NationsBank, N.A. v. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. (In
62 re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.), 268 B.R. 579 X
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2001).
63 In re NWFX, Inc., 267 B.R. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. X2001).
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Toy King
64 Distribs., Inc. v. Liberty Sav. Bank (In re Toy King X
Distribs., Inc.), 256 B.R. I (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
Desmond v. State Bank of Long Island (In re
65 Computer Eng'g Assocs.), 252 B.R. 253 (Bankr. D. X X
Mass. 2000).
66 Namer v. Sentinel Trust Co. (In re AVN Corp.), 248 X XB.R. 540 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000).
Red Bell Brewing Co. v. GS Capital, L.P. (In re
67 RBGSC Inv. Corp.), 242 B.R. 851 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. X X
2000).
Mar-Kay Plastics, Inc. v. Reid Plastics, Inc. (In re
68 Mar-Kay Plastics, Inc.), 234 B.R. 473 (Bankr. W.D. X X
Mo. 1999).
69 In re McKenzie Energy Corp., 228 B.R. 854 (Bankr. XS.D. Tex. 1998).
70 In re Blair, 226 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D. Me. 1998). X X
71 Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, X
Inc.), 225 B.R. 646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
72 Dionne v. First Ala. Bank (In re XYZ Options, Inc.), X X
217 B.R. 912 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998).
73 Breeden v. Bennett (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., X
Inc.), 220 B.R. 743 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1997).
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74 In re Island Helicopters, Inc., 211 B.R. 453 (Bankr. X X
E.D.N.Y 1997).
75 In re Rothman, 204 B.R. 143 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). X
Firstar Bank Burlington v. Stark Agric. Servs., Inc. (In
76 re Kevin W. Emerick Farms, Inc.), 201 B.R. 790 X X
(Bankr. C.D. 11. 1996).
77 Walter v. Celotex Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings X X
Corp.), 203 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
78 Litzler v. Am. Elk Conservatory, Inc. (In re Kelso), X196 B.R. 363 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
79 In re Sanborn, Inc., 181 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. Mass. X X
1995).
80 Dicello v. Jenkins (In re Int'l Loan Network, Inc.), X160 B.R. I (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993).
81 Smith v. Bank of New York (In re Hollywell Corp.), X X161 B.R. 302 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
82 In re Chateaugay Corp., 139 B.R. 598 (Bankr. X XS.D.N.Y. 1992).
83 In re Thymewood Apartments, Ltd., 129 B.R. 505 X(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
84 Kolinsky v. Russ (In re Kolinsky), 100 B.R. 695 X X(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
85 In re Carterhouse, Inc., 94 B.R. 271 (Bankr. D. Conn. X X1988).
86 Guinee v. Heydt (In re Wilson), 90 B.R. 208 (Bankr. X XE.D. Va. 1988).
87 In re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 60 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D. X XTex. 1986).
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# Name P C T
88 Fundex Capital Corp. v. Balaber-Strauss (In re Tampa X XChain Co.), 53 B.R. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
89 Lisk v. Criswell (In re Criswell), 52 B.R. 184 (Bankr. X XE.D. Va. 1985).
90 Amoco Oil Co. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 46 B.R. 130 X(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985).
91 Ernst v. Ohsman & Sons, Co. (In re Manchester X X
Hides, Inc.), 45 B.R. 794 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
92 Bungert v. Callaghan (In re Callaghan), 42 B.R. 821 X X(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
93 In re The Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 23 B.R. 62 X X
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
94 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Tenn-Ero Corp. (In re X X
Tenn-Ero Corp.), 14 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
95 In re Washington Med. Ctr., Inc., 10 B.R. 616 (Bankr. x X
D.D.C. 1981).
96 In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. X X1980).
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